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Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, FUENTES, Circuit Judge, 
and STARK,* 
 Chief District Judge 
 
(Filed:   August 30, 2017) 
 
Candace Cain 
Office of Federal Public Defender 
1001 Liberty Avenue 
1500 Liberty Center 
Pittsburgh, PA  15222 
 Counsel for Appellant 
 
Rebecca R. Haywood 
Michael L. Ivory 
Office of United States Attorney 
700 Grant Street 
Suite 4000 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 Counsel for Appellee 
 
_____________________ 
                                                 
* Honorable Leonard P. Stark, Chief Judge of the United 
States District Court for the District of Delaware, sitting 
by designation. 
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OPINION 
_____________________
 
SMITH, Chief Judge.  
 Jesse Nathaniel Penn, Jr., was convicted of being a 
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1).  After opening statements at Penn’s trial, the 
District Court removed one of the jurors, a student with 
scheduled surgery, replacing him with an alternate.  Penn 
now appeals, arguing that removing the juror deprived 
Penn of his “constitutional rights to due process, 
fundamental fairness, equal protection and an impartial 
jury” because the juror substitution violated Rule 
24(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  
Because the District Court did not abuse its discretion, 
we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I. 
 A one-count indictment charged Jesse Nathaniel 
Penn, Jr., with being a felon in possession of a firearm in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  At Penn’s first trial, 
the jury found him guilty.  His conviction was vacated on 
appeal.  See United States v. Penn, 616 F. App’x 524 (3d 
Cir. 2015).  On retrial, Penn was again found guilty.  This 
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timely appeal followed.1   
 We consider only Penn’s contention that he was 
deprived of his constitutional rights when the District 
Court excused a seated juror without making a finding 
that the juror was “unable to perform” his duties or that 
there was a ground for disqualifying the juror.2   
 The facts relative to this issue are undisputed.   
                                                 
1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
2 Penn raised two other issues solely for the purpose of 
preserving the issues for further review.  Both are 
foreclosed.  First, we agree that our decision in United 
States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 204–05 (3d Cir. 
2001), upholds the constitutionality of the felon-in-
possession statute.  Second, we conclude that Penn’s 
challenge to the application of the 15-year mandatory 
minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act 
also fails.  Penn argues that his convictions under 35 Pa. 
Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(30) are not “serious drug 
offenses” under the ACCA, but United States v. 
Henderson states otherwise.  See 841 F.3d 623, 631 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (stating that “documents underlying [the 
defendant’s] felony conviction under [35 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
§] 780-113(a)(30) stemming from a January 25, 2004 
indictment do . . . establish a serious drug offense under 
ACCA”).  Accordingly, we need not address these issues 
further. 
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 Voir dire for Penn’s trial commenced on Monday, 
August 24, 2015.  The District Court asked the members 
of the venire a series of preliminary questions.  Among 
the questions was whether there was “any legitimate 
justifiable hardship reason, personal, professional, 
business, medical condition or impairment, or otherwise 
why you could not serve as a juror for the duration of this 
short trial?”  A92.  Prospective Juror #207, a student at 
Clarion University, indicated that serving on the jury 
would be a hardship for him. 
 The next question was, “Defendant, Jesse 
Nathaniel Penn, Jr., is an African-American, as you can 
see.  Do you have such strong personal feelings, either 
positive or negative, regarding African-Americans which 
would affect your ability to be a fair and impartial juror 
in this case?”  A93.  No member of the venire responded 
affirmatively to that question.   
 Later, the District Court held individual voir dire 
in chambers.  At that time, Prospective Juror #207 
explained that he attended Clarion on a full-time basis 
and that the trial, which would last two to three days, 
would conflict with his scheduled tonsillectomy on 
Wednesday, August 26.  After the Court asked for a 
“medical excuse,” the prospective juror stated that he had 
been told his tonsils had to be removed and that the 
appointment had been scheduled for “two and a half or 
three weeks.”  A111.  In response, the Court asked him if 
he could contact the doctor’s office when he left and 
“reschedule it for the next day or Friday.”  Id.  The 
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prospective juror responded that rescheduling surgery 
would conflict with basketball preseason practice, which 
started the following week.  He added, “Sometimes that’s 
not easy to get surgery postponed.”  Id.  The District 
Court advised that it was not inclined to excuse the 
student from jury service because he did not “have any 
medical evidence” to show he had surgery scheduled and 
had not advised the jury operations office of his surgery.  
A112. 
 Further discussion revealed that the August 26 
appointment was the earliest appointment the prospective 
juror could secure after getting sick with bronchitis for 
the fourth time in July, that he was a varsity basketball 
player on a basketball scholarship, that he would be 
unable to perform activities for two weeks after the 
surgery, and that mandatory practices began the “[n]ext 
week.”  A112–13.   
 After the prospective juror left chambers, the 
District Judge said he had no objection to keeping him on 
the jury, adding, “I don’t believe him . . . because if he 
truly was having surgery on Wednesday, he would have 
notified the jury office that he is not available for a 
medical reason and his doctor would send a note to that 
effect.”  A114.  The Court completed voir dire, after 
which the student was seated as the ninth juror.  The jury 
was sworn in that afternoon and the Court gave the panel 
preliminary instructions.  After the prosecution and the 
defense made their opening statements, the Court 
adjourned for the day. 
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 The following morning, the District Court received 
a doctor’s note from the student, called the doctor’s 
office, and talked to the student again.3  The doctor’s 
note advised that the student had an appointment that day 
with his primary care physician in preparation for his 
surgery scheduled for the next day, Wednesday, August 
26.  The document concluded with the doctor’s electronic 
signature.  In its discussion with the student, the District 
Court indicated that the trial was underway, that the 
student had been sworn in as a juror, and that it was 
unlikely that he would be excused.  The District Court 
also contacted the doctor’s office and learned that the 
surgery could be rescheduled.  The doctor’s office 
confirmed, however, that surgery remained scheduled for 
the following morning.   
 Before reconvening, the District Court advised 
both prosecution and defense counsel about the note, the 
meeting with the student, and the call with the doctor’s 
office.  The District Judge indicated he had “rethought 
about it.”  A162.  Because there was “medical support” 
for the student’s need to undergo a tonsillectomy and the 
scheduling of his surgery, the District Court asked 
counsel for their consent to excuse the student and 
                                                 
3 The chronological sequence of these three events on 
Tuesday morning is not clear from the District Judge’s 
on-the-record recounting. 
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replace him with an alternate.4  A163. 
 The prosecution consented to excusing the student.  
Moreover, one of the prosecutors asserted that he had 
watched the student the day before and saw that the 
student was “yawning, disinterested, and clearly did not 
want to be there.”  A163–64.  Defense counsel disagreed 
that the student looked disinterested. 
 The Court redirected counsel to the issue of 
whether the student would “be a conscientious juror that 
he has this now verified medical condition with a surgery 
scheduled and not being able to do it.”  A164.  Defense 
counsel argued that the surgery was not a “front burner” 
problem or a “distraction” because the doctor’s office 
was willing to reschedule the surgery.  A164–65.  
Moreover, defense counsel stated that the District Court 
had not “made any findings.”  A165.   
 The Court told counsel “that [the student is] very 
reluctant about being here.”  A165–66.  The Court also 
noted that the student repeated that, in addition to 
missing his surgery, he would miss class and basketball.  
                                                 
4 The request for consent appears to have been a 
courtesy.  Other courts have held that “[t]he trial judge 
does not need a defendant’s consent to replace a juror 
with an alternate before the jury retires; all that is 
required is a reasonable cause for the replacement.”  
United States v. Fajardo, 787 F.2d 1523, 1526 (11th Cir. 
1986) (citing United States v. Ellenbogen, 365 F.2d 982, 
989 (2d Cir. 1966)). 
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When defense counsel said nothing had changed since 
voir dire, the District Court responded, “Yes, it has. We 
now have evidence.”  A167.  The Court overruled 
defense counsel’s objection, excused the student, and 
seated an alternate juror. 
 Defense counsel then put on the record that the 
student was African-American and that there was only 
one other African-American on the jury, a middle-aged 
woman.  (From this, we infer that the alternate was not 
African-American.)  The District Court responded, 
“[T]he fact that [the student] is an African-American has 
absolutely no bearing on the Court’s decision to allow 
this young man to go forward with his surgery that’s 
scheduled for tomorrow.”  A168.   
 After a recess, the jury trial resumed.  The next 
day, the jury convicted Penn of being a felon in 
possession.  This timely appeal followed.   
 On appeal, Penn argues that substituting the 
alternate for the student deprived Penn of his 
constitutional rights to due process, fundamental fairness, 
equal protection, and an impartial jury. 
II. 
Penn’s constitutional claims are subject to plenary 
review.  See Gov’t of V.I. v. Davis, 561 F.3d 159, 163 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  We review the removal of a juror for an 
abuse of discretion.  See United States v. Cameron, 464 
F.2d 333, 335 (3d Cir. 1972).  
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III. 
Penn’s constitutional claims fail.  Penn’s equal 
protection claim, the only one of Penn’s constitutional 
claims for which Penn cites any caselaw, is meritless.  
All of Penn’s arguments are based on the District Court’s 
alleged failure to comply with Rule 24(c)(1) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.   
A.  Penn’s Constitutional Claims Are Based on His 
Claim that Rule 24(c)(1) Was Violated 
Penn argues that four constitutional rights were 
violated: equal protection, due process, fundamental 
fairness, and an impartial jury.   
Most of his argument is undeveloped.  Penn comes 
closest to developing an argument about his right to equal 
protection through his emphasis on the student’s race and 
invocations of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  
See, e.g., Reply Br. 29 (“[O]nce the jury was chosen 
through a process of peremptory challenges, in a case 
involving an African-American defendant and 
replacement of an African-American juror, removal of 
the juror contrary to Rule 24 implicated Mr. Penn’s 
constitutional rights [and] is reversible error and cannot 
be dismissed as harmless.”).  But his argument is wrong 
on the merits.   
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Penn seems to believe that, under Batson5 or some 
novel permutation thereof,6 he was entitled to maintain 
the racial composition of the jury as it was selected.  Of 
course, there is no such right.  See United States v. 
Mendoza, 510 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Mendoza 
is not entitled to any Hispanics on the jury, nor by 
implication is he entitled to any one individual juror.” 
(citation omitted) (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 
522, 538 (1975))). 
                                                 
5 Penn suggests that Batson might have applied directly 
in this case to the judge’s decision to replace the student.  
Even if such claims existed, which Penn does not show, 
there would be no viable Batson claim here because Penn 
failed to “show[] that the totality of the relevant facts 
gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose” and 
a fortiori failed to “prove[] purposeful racial 
discrimination” in the removal of the student.  Wilson v. 
Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 666 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johnson v. California, 
545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005)).   
6 On reply, Penn analogizes to cases in which a district 
court deprives the defendant of his or her peremptory 
strikes.  See, e.g., Reply Br. 21 (“Here, the district court 
also impaired Mr. Penn’s right to peremptory 
challenges . . . .”).  This argument, like Penn’s others, is 
premised on the District Court’s failure to offer sufficient 
findings under Rule 24(c)(1).  As discussed below, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion under the Rule. 
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Penn also failed to substantiate his claims that his 
rights to due process, fundamental fairness, or an 
impartial jury were infringed by the substitution of the 
alternate juror.  Because these arguments are totally 
undeveloped, they could be considered waived.  Cf. 
Avaya Inc., RP v. Telecom Labs, Inc., 838 F.3d 354, 416–
17 (3d Cir. 2016); John Wyeth & Brother Ltd. v. CIGNA 
Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(“[A]rguments raised in passing . . . , but not squarely 
argued, are considered waived.”); Rodriguez v. 
Municipality of San Juan, 659 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 
2011) (“It should go without saying that we deem waived 
claims not made or claims adverted to in a cursory 
fashion, unaccompanied by developed argument.”). 
However, we need not rule on waiver because 
Penn’s constitutional arguments are all premised on the 
idea that the District Court abused its discretion under 
Rule 24(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.  Thus, we turn to the question of whether the 
District Court complied with Rule 24(c)(1). 
B.  The District Court Did Not Abuse Its 
Discretion when Replacing the Student 
Rule 24(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure states, “The court may impanel up to 6 
alternate jurors to replace any jurors who are unable to 
perform or who are disqualified from performing their 
duties.”  In this case, after talking with the student twice, 
seeing the student’s “medical evidence” that surgery was 
scheduled, and hearing the student’s concerns about 
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missing his surgery, his classes, and his basketball 
practice, the District Court excused the student from 
further service over defense counsel’s objections.   
On appeal, Penn argues (1) that the District Court 
needed to make explicit findings on the record and (2) 
that those findings needed to show that it was essentially 
impossible for the student to continue service.  These 
arguments fail because the District Court’s reasoning was 
clear and because excusing a juror for the reasons that 
appear on this record does not constitute an abuse of 
discretion. 
First, Penn’s argument that the District Court 
“made no findings,” Penn Br. 48, is contradicted by the 
record.  It is true that the District Court did not issue a 
written document labeled “Findings.”  But Rule 24(c) 
imposes no such obligation on the District Court.7  See 
United States v. Bradley, 173 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 
1999) (upholding the dismissal of a juror because “the 
                                                 
7 Penn refers to “procedures” or “formal procedures 
under Rule 24,” e.g., Penn Br. 47, but has not identified 
any procedures required by any authority that the District 
Court failed to follow, see, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 
992 F.2d 1224, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“Although the 
trial judge did not verify the juror’s claim with the 
court’s medical staff, nothing in the rule or case law 
suggests that the judge must temper his discretion by 
performing any particular test to determine whether a 
juror is competent.”). 
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record shows that the court dismissed her for inability to 
serve as a juror[] and that the court had sufficient 
information to support the dismissal”); United States v. 
Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 37–38 (6th Cir. 1975) (relying on 
the trial record to hold that a District Court “properly” 
excused “a juror midway through the trial with ‘no more 
than a cursory examination’ into the juror’s illness”); cf. 
Cameron, 464 F.2d at 335 (“[T]he trial judge, in his 
sound discretion, may remove a juror and replace him 
with an alternate juror whenever facts are presented 
which convince the trial judge that the juror’s ability to 
perform his duty as a juror is impaired.” (emphasis 
added)); United States v. Pineda, 743 F.3d 213, 217 (7th 
Cir. 2014) (“This Court will not overturn the trial court’s 
decision to dismiss a juror pursuant to Rule 24(c) unless 
no legitimate basis for the court’s decision can be found 
in the record . . . .”); United States v. Virgen-Moreno, 265 
F.3d 276, 288 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The district court was not 
required to conduct an evidentiary hearing . . . .  The 
reasons that [the juror] offered [in a note] were sufficient 
factual support for the district court’s decision.”); United 
States v. Reese, 33 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(“Whether and to what extent a juror should be 
questioned regarding the circumstances of a need to be 
excused is also within the trial judge’s sound 
discretion.”).8 
                                                 
8 Forty-five years ago, we wrote, “Both parties to this 
appeal have pointed out the paucity of reported cases 
which have considered what grounds may properly 
15 
 
The District Court clearly articulated its reasoning 
on the record.  The District Court explained its concern 
that the student might “be a disruption . . . to the other 
members of the jury,” indicated that the “medical 
support” for the student’s condition and scheduled 
surgery was important, and concluded, after meeting with 
the student, that he was “very reluctant about being 
here . . . [b]ecause he is going to miss his surgery, he has 
missed his classes, and he is going to miss his basketball 
next week because the surgery will be rescheduled.”  
A162–66.   
Second, before the District Court and on appeal, 
Penn suggests that the words “unable to perform” and 
“disqualified” in Rule 24(c)(1) only allow jurors to be 
replaced when it is impossible for them to serve.  For 
instance, Penn argues that the student was not “unable to 
perform” or “disqualified” because the surgery could be 
postponed.   
Courts have not construed Rule 24(c)(1) to create 
such a high bar to replacing jurors.  Indeed, courts have 
upheld a District Court dismissing jurors under Rule 
24(c) for many reasons that did not completely prevent a 
juror from serving: 
 “a planned business trip,” Reese, 33 F.3d at 
                                                                                                             
support the trial judge’s removing a juror and replacing 
him.”  United States v. Cameron, 464 F.2d 333, 335 (3d 
Cir. 1972).  That lack of authority continues to this day, 
so we look to other circuits’ persuasive precedent. 
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173; 
 “sinus problems [that] were a distraction to the 
proceedings” even though “the juror in question 
was well enough to continue,” United States v. 
Puche, 350 F.3d 1137, 1152 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(describing United States v. Fajardo, 787 F.2d 
1523 (11th Cir. 1986)); 
 when a juror “had a serious argument with her 
husband on the telephone the night before,” 
United States v. Brown, 571 F.2d 980, 984 (6th 
Cir. 1978); 
 “the illness and hospitalization of [the juror’s] 
87-year old mother in New Mexico,” United 
States v. Dominguez, 615 F.2d 1093, 1094–96 
(5th Cir. 1980); and 
 when a juror-nurse’s “patient suffered a heart 
attack,” Cameron, 464 F.2d at 335 (describing 
United States v. Houlihan, 332 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 
1964)).   
See also United States v. De Oleo, 697 F.3d 338, 342 (6th 
Cir. 2012) (citing other cases).   
Most notably, in a persuasive opinion, United 
States v. De Oleo, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit held that a district court did not abuse its 
discretion by replacing a juror-student who “did not want 
to miss the beginning of school.”  De Oleo, 697 F.3d at 
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341–42.  The Sixth Circuit explained that “it is not the 
conflict’s objective seriousness but its impact on a 
particular juror that matters.”  Id. at 342.   
Here, as in De Oleo, the juror-student was 
concerned about missing classes.  In Penn’s case, the 
student’s “objective seriousness” is higher than in De 
Oleo because delaying the surgery could also affect the 
student’s health and ability to play basketball, for which 
he had a scholarship.  Moreover, the District Court 
clearly assessed the “impact” of the conflict on the 
student when the District Court concluded that the 
student was “very reluctant about being here.”  A165–66.  
Thus, it seems reasonable that the impact of missing 
classes was higher on the Penn juror than on the De Oleo 
juror. 
Penn argues that De Oleo cannot be compared to 
this case because, in De Oleo, “the student was promised 
by the judge she would not miss classes and was 
replaced, as promised, when the trial ran longer than 
expected.”  Reply Br. 27.  We fail to appreciate why that 
difference matters.  We recognize that the circumstances 
in De Oleo were slightly different than here.  In De Oleo, 
the defense failed to object when the district court added 
the student to the jury on the condition that that student 
would be excused if trial ran long.  De Oleo, 697 F.3d at 
342. 
At all events, whether the circumstances here are 
exactly the same as those in De Oleo is not 
determinative.  It should go without saying that decisions 
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related to juror substitution are within the discretion of 
the trial court.  See United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 
154 (3d Cir. 1993) (“In light of the district court’s wide 
latitude in making the kind of credibility determinations 
underlying the removal of a juror, we conclude the 
rulings here were well within its discretion.”); see also 
De Oleo, 697 F.3d at 342 (“[D]istrict judges are in the 
best position to view a juror’s demeanor and determine 
whether she [or he] is able to shoulder the obligations of 
jury service.”); Dominguez, 615 F.2d at 1095 (“It is 
settled law in this and other circuits that it is within the 
trial judge’s sound discretion to remove a juror whenever 
the judge becomes convinced that the juror’s abilities to 
perform his duties become impaired.”). 
The District Court’s decision here was clearly 
within its discretion. 
IV. 
The decision to substitute a juror was within the 
sound discretion of the District Court.  Because the 
District Court acted well within its discretion in excusing 
the juror, we will affirm.  
 
